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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Appellant's reply brief to respondent's brief on appeal and
the appellant's brief in response to respondent's cross-appeal are
both contained herein.
In both briefs, appellant has directed her argument to the
issues outlined by the respondent.

Therefore, there is no new

statement of the issues with regard to the appellant's appeal,
other than those contained in her original appellant's brief.
The respondent's cross-appeal is so short so as to make a
reframing of issues unnecessary.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the decision of the Third District
Court, Judge Scott Daniels, on a petition to modify a decree of
divorce, argued March 5th-6th, 1985.
parent, Carol Blackburn

The appellant, custodial

(Moyes), asks this court to reverse the

lower court's decision to deny her a judgment for arrearages in
3

child support.
The respondent subsequently petitioned the lower court to
reduce his child support obligation.

He cross-appeals the lower

court's decision, claiming the lower court did not reduce his child
support obligation enough.

The respondent requests that the court

further reduce his child support obligation, or remand the matter
for the same purpose.

STATEMENT OF THE CASES
The two briefs herein contain no new statement

of the

facts.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
No new summary of the arguments presented herein has been
provided.
to

new

The appellant's reply brief on her appeal responds only
points

contained

in

the

respondent's

brief.

The

respondent's cross-appeal brief and the reply contained herein, are
both

sufficiently

short

as

to

not

arguments contained therein.

4

warrant

a

summary

of the

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
ISSUE I
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

under the standard

The

plaintiff-respondent

argues,

of review portion of his responsive brief,

beginning on page 9 thereof, that Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure governs the overturning of lower court findings of
fact.

With this proposition, the appellant agrees.

Rule 52(a)

provides that findings of a lower court should not be set aside
unless they are clearly erroneous.
The

appellant

does

not

argue

that

the

lower

court's

findings of fact were clearly erroneous as to what happened.

The

appellant, however, does not believe that the preponderance of the
evidence supported a finding by the court that agreements were made
between the parties to forgive a child support obligation.
Appellant simply argues that a more reasonable conclusion to have
come to, considering all of the testimony, would have been to
conclude that the appellant acquiesced in the face of her former
husband's aggressive

insistence on terms and conditions of her

being able to leave the State of Colorado.

The wealth of detail in

the respondent's testimony concerning all of the things he said and
all of his plans, thoughts and assumptions, does not effectively
negate the appellant's simple statements that she never made an
"agreement" to reduce child support with the respondent.

Appellant

requests of the court that they consider the possibility that
acquiesence is a more reasonable interpretation of the testimony
5

and is more consistent with that testimony than an interpretation
which requires one to believe that the appellant simply perjured
herself.

The appellant, however, does not argue that the courts

finding was clearly erroneous.
What the appellant argues is that the application of the
law to the facts by the lower court was in error.

This is recited

and argued in appellant's brief, beginning on page 14.
findings, as they
inconsistent

and

apply

The courts

the law to the facts, are internally

incongruent.

The court below was

apparently

confused as to what point in time is used as a reference point in
determining what is future child support and what is arrearage.
Both of the agreements Judge Daniels found were made, were as to
then future child support.
to the trial date.
numbered 3:

They were only arrearages with respect

When the lower court stated in its finding

"...defendant does not have the power to waive future

payments from this time forward, in that they are not her to waive.
They belong to the children."

The court failed to recognize that

the mother-appellant was in the same position at the time of the
"agreement" to waive then future payments.

B.
brief

The respondent argues, commencing on page 10 of his

that,

reimbursement

in

fact,

for child

a

person

support

may

be

estopped

arrearages.

proposition, the appellant also agrees.

to

With this

collect
simple

Appellant, in her own

brief, argues that estoppel as a defense for the non-payment of
child

support

should exist, but only in limited circumstances.
6

Those limited circumstances should be those where the purported
acts upon which the obligor relied were:

1)

not an agreement; and

2) especially not an agreement to forgive then future child support
payments.
In this

case, both of the alleged

agreements were to

forgive a then future child support obligation.
forgive

a

then

arrearage.

Appellant's

Neither was to

position

is that the

doctrine of estoppel is a defense which is alive and well and
available to a child support obligor, but only as to back child
support obligations which, at the time of the alleged agreement,
were then arrearages.

The case law is clear that the parties are

incapable of making an agreement, either oral or in writing, to
forgive then future child support without prior approval of the
court.
Respondent contends that appellant made an agreement in the
fall of 1979 to reduce child support from $400.00 per month to
$120.00 per month, and to allow the respondent, from that time
forward, to no longer pay $320.00 of the court ordered $440.00
child support.

This $320.00 per month had been previously paid by

respondent in the form of a house payment.

Such an agreement, if

looked at then, was then as to future payments due.
writing and was not approved by the court.

It was not in

It, therefore, violated

public policy because it was prohibited by common law, and was
void, ab initio.

Our courts have ruled these agreements are void

and of no effect.

The question

is not whether there was an

arrearage at the time of trial.

There clearly was.
7

The only

question is as to whether or not the "agreement" allegedly made was
as to then arrearage or future payments.
Similarly, respondent alleges that later, in Provo, Utah,
the parties entered into a written agreement memorializing their
earlier

agreement,

entitled

Revised

Child

Support

Again, this agreement was then as to future support.

Agreement.

Said document

does not even purport to contain a written agreement between the
parties to forgive what were then arrearages, but was a document to
be controlling in the future.

It was not approved by the court,

the court was eliminated from the review process as to that change
in the terms of the decree.

The question, again, is not whether

those amounts were arrearages at the time of trial in March, 1985,
but whether the agreement was as to then future child support to
become due.

If the "agreement" was as to then future payments, the

"agreement" is and was void for failure to be approved by the
court.

Therefore,

no

estoppel

defense

is

available

to

the

respondent on these facts.

C.

There is no dispute between the parties concerning

what the elements of estoppel in a child support case are.
are four:

a)

affirmative acts;

There

b) reasonable reliance;

c)

change in position; and d) to ones detriment.
The appellant testified that she had conversations with the
respondent in which he requested concessions from her in connection
with her decision to sell the Colorado home and move to Provo,
Utah.

She further testified that over a period of years, she came
8

to expect that she could not get more money out of her former
husband than he said he would pay her.

The appellant testified

that she never agreed to any of the reductions or demands that the
respondent made, and her testimony to that effect was clear and
unequivocal.

The respondent stated his position to the appellant

many times.

She was not in the mood to fight with him.

The

respondent believed that his position was just, the appellant did
not believe she would convince him to the contrary by fighting him.
Although she did not agree, she avoided him and did nothing.

The

respondent, based upon his misunderstanding of the law, and his
selfish views of fairness, came to believe that she had made an
agreement when, in fact, she had not.
Similarly, the appellant

later, after she had left and

moved to Provo, Utah, signed a document which stated that the
respondent would
"...continue to pay Carol $120.00 for child support, with
an added inflation adjustment as follows: in January of
each year, the monthly payment will increase by $10, ie,
beginning January, 1981, monthly payments will be $130;
beginning January 1982, monthly payments will be $140,
etc..." Revised Child Support Agreement, 11-13-80
Although his agreement is referred to as a memorial of the earlier
agreement it, in fact, does not refer to any earlier agreement.

It

simply is a written document which purports to forgive, in advance,
what were then future child support payments.

This agreement was

never approved by the court.
Again,

the

appellant

testified

that

she

signed

this

document because she believe that it was all she would get from the
respondent,

regardless

of her efforts or protestations
9

to the

contrary.

She saw it as an opportunity to lock in some increases.

Appellant's further testimony was the she did not understand this
document to be a "giving up" of the $320.00 per month previously
ordered by the Colorado court as child support, but paid in the
form of a house payment, because it made no reference to that
provision of the decree.
Appellant has never disagreed with or denied that she wrote
letters requesting payment from the respondent of $120.00, or any
other lesser amount as child support.

What the appellant denies is

that she ever agreed to give up her court ordered child support.
The testimony of the appellant was that she had no hope of getting
more out of her former husband than he had decided he would pay,
and that to engage him in argument or litigation would bring her
more frustration than money.

Arguments by respondent that the

appellant has admitted such an agreement, because she wrote letters
in which she asked for amounts of money which were less than the
child

support

ordered,

are self

serving.

These

letters were

written after the appellant had been bullied into believing she
should not and, therefore, would not get more.

D.
appellant,

Respondent argues on page 14 of his brief that the
by

her

conduct

and

representations,

prevented

respondent from taking their agreement in before the courts.

the
When

respondent asked at trial on cross examination what appellant had
done to prevent him from taking the agreement before the courts,
respondent replied that she had said that
10

"...she did not want to

go back to court because she was in a hurry to sell the house,
move, and enroll in September classes..."

(at BYU).

Respondent

fails to bring to the attention of the court, in claiming he was
prevented from going to court, that: 1)

He did not need the

cooperation of his former wife to go back to court.

He could have

filed a petition for modification and had his former wife served.
He did not do this; and

2)

The respondent would have had to

explain to a Colorado court why it was fair to amend the decree of
divorce to eliminate three quarters of the child support payment,
simply because the plaintiff wanted to move from Colorado and
attend school in Utah.
Appellant

believes

that

respondent

would

have

had

a

difficult time convincing the Colorado court, or any court, that
appellant was obligated to stay in the home of the parties so that
he could continue to enjoy a tax write off he had assumed was his,
and which had little or no value.

Similarly, appellant believes

respondent would have had a hard time convincing the Colorado court
that appellant was supposed to take her one-half of the equity in
the house as child support and let the respondent get his one-half
of the equity as his return on the investment.

The argument that

the appellant did anything to keep the respondent from taking his
alleged agreement before the courts is without merit.

E.

Again,

on

page

14,

respondent

argues

that

the

appellant had a duty to speak up and object to the support checks
which she received and endorsed.

Respondent implies that if she
11

was not willing to accept the checks for $120.00 he was sending as
payment in full, that she should have refused them.

Respondent

apparently believes that some type of accord and satisfaction was
taking place, and that appellant should be estopped on the basis
that by taking respondent's $120.00 per month payments she has
waived her right to collect the amounts respondent did not pay at a
later time.

This is like the respondents argument that by talking

about lower amounts in letters, the appellant had given her child
support up.
This

is why

public

policy,

along

with

precedent,

has

resulted in Supreme Court decisions which require agreements to
reduce child support prospectively be approved by court order.

It

is simply too easy for child support obligors to bully former wives
into prospective reductions in child support.

The instant case is

a prime example.
Respondent
acquiesced

in the

argues

that

support

amount

$13,000.00 in her pocket."

the

appellant

"intentionally

of $120.00, because

Of course she did.

she had

One of the best

opportunities for a former husband to bully a woman into acceptance
or toleration of a reduction in the court ordered child support, is
to press her at a time when she has some money and feels that she
can get along without all of the ordered support.

Respondent fails

to point out that the $13,000.00 which the appellant had came from
her one-half of the equity from the sale of the parties former
home, and that respondent also received $13,000.00 for his onehalf.
12

On page 15 of respondent's reply brief, he argues that it
was reasonable for him to rely on the defendant's actions and to
change his position because of them.
that

she had

obtained

The appellant's actions were

a divorce from the respondent,

she was

awarded $440.00 per month as child support, $120.00 of which was
paid directly to her and $320.00 of which was paid in the form of a
house payment.

Appellant indicated that she wanted to leave the

state, go to BYU, and take the children with her.

Respondent

immediately told her that it was unfair for her to leave Colorado,
and that he would lose tax advantages he had claimed on the home
through

claiming

the

depreciation thereof.

interest

paid

on the home

loan and the

According to respondent, the appellant, in

not jumping up and slapping him in the face and saying "No!",
induced him, mislead him and caused him to reasonably rely on their
"agreement".
Appellant

now wishes that

going back to court at the time.

she had aggressively pursued

Only then would she have realized

that she did not have to "put up with" the imposition of such
unfair terms in order to sell the house, get her equity, and leave
the state.

What the respondent relied on was his ability to bully

his former wife into unfair terms.

The terms were unreasonable.

His reliance, if any, was unreasonable.
It
difference

is very

important

between

the

at this juncture

language

in

the

to explain the

separation

agreement

documents which the parties signed prior to their divorce (which
was the basis for the divorce), and the decree of divorce document.
13

The separation agreement which the parties signed prior to the
decree of divorce, (Appendix "A")

had a provision which stated in

paragraph 12 thereof, that "No modification or waiver of any of the
terms of this agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed
by both parties."

This provision clearly stated that the parties

could, at any time, and by written agreement, amend that separation
agreement.

It was not intended to be a provision allowing the

parties to amend the decree of divorce, or any other document.

No

language granting the parties any such power exists in the decree
of divorce.

Respondent argues that because of the language in the

separation agreement, the parties obtained the power to modify, by
themselves,

in writing,

any portion

of the decree of divorce

subsequently entered.
It is not possible for parties, by private agreement, to
eliminate the state, through the courts as a supervisor, overseer
and protector of the children's rights.

The parties could not

then, and cannot now, by agreement, eliminate the requirement that
agreements

for

the

reduction

approved by the court.

of prospective

child

support

be

Public policy and Utah case law are clearly

to the contrary.
Again, at the bottom of page 15 of his brief, respondent
argues that a reasonable person would have believed that they could
rely on the terms of the revised child support agreement entered
into between the parties and had the authority to make written
revisions of the separation agreement.

Even if the status of the

law were that parties could amend their decrees of divorce by
14

private agreement with regard to child support, it would not be
reasonable for the respondent to believe that he could rely on the
enforcement of such unfair terms.

A reasonable person could not

assume that his former wife could be forced to:
1.

Stay in the home, giving up her right to move from it

2.

Not be able to sell and get her equity from the home,

at will;

without making a concession of the loss of three quarters of her
child support;
3.

Give up child support as a penalty in order to obtain

the freedom to move;
4.

and

Shift the burden of child support from the respondent

to the appellant's mother, as a condition of allowing her to move
and receive her equity in the home.
Again, if the parties had gone back to court at the time,
this would have become abundantly clear to the respondent.
At the bottom

of page

15 and the top of page

16 of

respondent's brief, he argues that "Finally, a reasonable person
would have believed his children, on the sum of $120.00 per month,
were adequately supported, because the appellant had $13,000.00 in
her pocket."

The respondent had been ordered to pay the appellant

$440.00 per month in child support.

Provisions had been made that

$320.00 of that child support obligation could be paid in the form
of the payment on the home, the use and possession of which had
been awarded to the appellant and the children.

Respondent's

argument suggests that the appellant should pay some penalty for
15

her choice to relocate.
Respondent argues on page 16 of the reply brief that he
lost his visitation because of his reasonable reliance on the acts
of the appellant.

He did not.

Appellant had freedom under the

Constitution of the United States to move freely among the United
States, and outside this country's boarders to travel and relocate
at will.

She made her desires known to the respondent.

intentions were clear and unequivocal.
a fit mother.

Her

The appellant was, and is,

With this the respondent has agreed.

Respondent

made no claim that custody of the children should be changed in
connection with appellant's leaving the state.
rights remained the same.

His visitation

Increase in the difficulty of visiting

was an unavoidable side effect of relocation.
If the respondent's argument is that a reduction in child
support was reasonable because he was not going to be able to see
his children as much, then he mistakenly believes that the payment
of child support buys opportunity for visitation.
was

bartering

inappropriate.

visitation

against

child

If respondent

support,

it

was

Visitation is not an appropriate estopple issue.

Respondent

further

argues

that,

by

relying

on

his

"agreement" with the appellant, he gave up a piece of property in
which he was building equity.
merit.

Again, this argument is without

Both parties were building equity in the home during the

year between the time of the divorce and the time of its sale.
Both parties lost the benefit of that investment upon the sale of
the home, but respondent agreed to the sale and to the sale price.
16

Both parties received more than $13,000.00 as their share of the
equity from that sale.

Each of the parties was free to reinvest at

any rate of return they could acquire.
to

cash

out

appellant's

interest

The respondent did not ask

and

retain

the

home

as an

investment, but rather, was satisfied to sell the home and get the
equity.
impose

The argument that respondent should have been allowed to
upon

the

appellant

a

reduction

in

child

support

to

compensate him for the loss of his investment is an unreasonable
argument.
Respondent

argues that he gave up a $408.00 per month

benefit when the home was sold.

Appellant does not argue that the

house payment was not $408.00 per month.
is not $408.00.

The tax benefit, however,

The deduction may have been close to $408.00 per

month if the payment was in the early part of the loan.

However,

the benefit of such a deduction, depending on the income of the
parties would have been less than one-third of that, in terms of
tax dollars saved.

Respondent argues as though deductions are the

equivalent of tax credits.
A fatal flaw in the reasoning of the respondent with regard
to his tax benefits

argument,

is simply that during the year

following divorce, respondent made approximately $20,000.00.
for the next four or five years he had no taxable income.

But
A tax

deduction would have been of no benefit to him anyway.
At the top of page 17, respondent argues the fourth element
of estoppel, i.e., the showing of actual detriment.
claims that he relied to his detriment
17

Respondent

such that it would be

unreasonable now to go back and enter a judgment against him for
arrearages.

In the material on page 17 of respondent's brief, not

a single change in position for the worse is articulated.

There is

a reference to the injuries outlined in the third element on page
16 of the brief.

The respondent did not lose visitation rights.

His visitation became for difficult for him to exercise.

This is

not a loss which makes it unfair to grant a judgment for arrearages
in child support.
If he had put the monies he had saved in child support,
after bullying his former wife into not expecting it anymore, into
an interest bearing account, he could pay it now, and actually have
benefited by not paying.

There is no showing that he experienced

financial detriment because his wife left the State of Colorado.
Respondent did give up his investment in the home, but at the same
time, cashed out his investment, receiving its equivalent in cash.
If he chose to not reinvest that money, or did not reinvest it as
well, that was his own choosing.

There was no showing that he lost

money because he was cashed out of the home.

Under these facts,

the respondent has improved his position by not having paid child
support.
The final argument of the respondent in reply to the brief
of the appellant commences on page 17 of his brief, and continues
over to page 18.

It this argument, he claims that in Larsen, 300

P.2d 596 (Utah, 1956), the court approved estoppel as a defense
when the parties had made an agreement to what was then, in time,
going to be future child support payments.
18

Such an interpretation

of

Larsen

flies

directly

in the

face

of the

cases cited by

appellant in her brief, and in which the courts have stated that
future child support cannot be bargained away, and the cases which
required

that

any

attempt

to affect

the

future child

support

obligation of a child support obligor must not only be in writing,
but previously approved by the court.
Respondent further argues at the bottom of page 19 of his
brief, that:
"The trial court did not give the revised child support
agreement document... subsequent to Carol Moyes leaving
Denver, prospective or future application."
The court's published findings of fact and conclusions of law did
estop the appellant from collecting what was then future support.
The court stated that:
"The evidence was clear that the from the testimony
presented from the modification agreement that the
intention was that she would only collect $120.00 per
month. He would allow her to sell the house. He relied
on that. And I think she was estopped from collecting
back child support.
However, I do not think estoppel
applies to future payments...you can't waive future
payments, really.
They are not her rights to waive.
They belong to the children."
The court below did,

in fact, give the revised child support

agreement of the parties future and prospective application with
regard to child support to be owing from November 13th, 1980 (the
date of the agreement, Appendix "C") forward.

Those monies only

became arrearages with respect to the time of trial.
Child

Support

arrearage.

Agreement

made

no

mention

of

That Revised

forgiving

a then

When the appellant went to court before Judge Daniels

on March of 1985, her claim was simply that the parties could not
19

have, at the time in question, made a deal to barter away what was
then prospectively owed.

Similarly, the oral "agreement" in the

fall of 1979 was as to future payments and no estoppel defense can
arise.

Therefore, it was not bartered away, and there were, at the

time of trial, legitimately due and owing arrearages.

20

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON RESPONDENT'S CROSS-APPEAL
ISSUE II
LOWER COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW STATUTORY FACTORS
REQUIRED TO SUPPORT DOLLAR CALCULATIONS
Respondent has cross-appealed in this matter.
appeals

the

outcome

of

trial

on

his

subsequent

Respondent

petition

for

modification which was tried on the 31st day of January, 1986, and
which

was

completed

on the

13th

day

of

February,

1986.

In

respondents cross-appeal, he argues that in reducing his support
obligation to the appellant, the court did not comply with Section
78-45-7(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,

which sets forth

seven factors the court must consider in petitions for modification
for a reduction in child support.
Appellant has difficulty in answering the cross-appeal of
the

respondent.

proceedings

of

This
the

is because

modification

respondent

trial

from

has not had the
which

he

appeals

transcribed.
Appellant agrees that there are statutory elements which
should have been considered by the court.

The appellant does,

however, disagree with the respondent concerning error on the part
of the court.

Respondent argues on page 19 of his brief, that:

"The court heard evidence from the respondent as to his
income and ability to earn. No evidence was presented on
the other factors of support.11
There is no transcript before this court to indicate what evidence
was presented and what was not.

There being no transcript offered

by respondent on cross-appeal, he can not document what evidence
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was or was not presented at trial.

The respondent herein was the petitioner.
was

the

one

circumstances
support

who

alleged

which

that

warranted

obligation.

It

a

was

there

had

been

reconsideration
the

The respondent
a
of

change
his

petitioner-respondent,

of

child
Mr.

Blackburn, who had the burden of both moving forward with the case,
and of persuasion.

The matter was tried to the court.

If no

evidence was presented on the other five factors bearing on the
modification issue as claimed by respondent, then the respondent
failed to meet his burden.
Considerable testimony and evidence was introduced at the
time of trial concerning the actual income of the obligor, the
respondent,

and his ability to earn.

A substantial amount of

testimony established the fact that the respondent, subsequent to
the sale of the home in Colorado, quit his job because he did not
like the "hassle and pressure" associated with it.

The evidence

further showed that the respondent lived on the $13,000.00 equity
his received out of the sale of the home, and by his own choice,
experienced self-imposed poverty.
When asked what he did with all of his time during those
many months

(years) he was unemployed between the 1980 revised

child support agreement and the trial date (1986), the respondent's
only answer was that he "read books".
The
presented

failure

evidence

of the respondent
on

in this matter to have

five of the seven
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elements outlined by

statute

as

being

relevant,

was

the

respondent's

own

fault.

Respondent cannot now argue that the court failed to consider the
five issues on which the respondent presented no evidence.
The revised child support agreement which respondent urges
should have been adopted by the court as evidence and a guideline
on the issues of the needs of the children, was, at the time of
hearing, more than five years old, and was never offered to the
court as evidence of the needs of the children.

The respondent had

no duty of support to any other children or person.
Appellant was home with young children under the age of
five years, and unable to work.

Her husband, Jack Moyes, was

unemployed as of the time of trial. All of these factors led the
court to conclude as it did in the matter, as follows:
"1. The court finds that there has been a
material change of circumstances which has occurred since
the decree of divorce was entered in this matter, in that
the plaintiff is not now employed, whereas, he was
employed at the time the decree of divorce was entered in
Colorado.
2.
The court finds that the plaintiff has
sufficient earning capacity to pay $165.00 per child, per
month, as child support for a total child support
obligation of $330.00 per month..."
These findings show that the court understood that the
plaintiff was unemployed at the time.

They also show that the

basis for a reduction in child support was a loss of income.

The

findings also show, however, that the court felt the preponderance
of the credible evidence showed the respondent to have sufficient
earning capacity to pay the reduced amount of $165.00 per child,
for a total of $330.00 per month.
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With

no

transcript,

respondent

cannot

demonstrate

that

these findings are clearly erroneous as outlined in Rule 52a, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Again,

it was respondents burden to put on all of the

evidence he wanted considered at a trial on a reduction of his
child support.

If the court had insufficient evidence, respondent

failed to meet his burden.
It is the respondents burden to demonstrate to this court
on appeal that the lower court made clearly erroneous findings.
This would require reference to a record of the proceedings, so
that this court could see the clear error.

The respondent has not

provided any transcript of proceedings.
The findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.

The best

evidence is that the lower court considered properly all evidence
presented.
Respondent argues, under a heading "Revised Child Support
Agreement"
permitted
parties."

on page
the

20 of his brief, that

parties

to

amend,

in

"The foreign decree

writing,

signed

by

both

A review of the Colorado decree of divorce does not

reveal any language which purports to allow the parties to amend it
in writing, orally or in any other way.
The remainder of the respondent's arguments, to the effect
that the Colorado court did not need to exercise control over the
agreements of the parties, because they had turned such control
over to the parties, fails because the document simply does not
provide that.

Nothing in the Colorado decree suggests that it was
24

designed for the purposes of allowing future modification by the
parties of the child support obligation, without court approval.

CONCLUSION
Although the court's findings are not clearly erroneous as
to whether the parties ever entered into an oral agreement, or as
to the intention of the parties in entering into the subsequent
Revised Child Support Agreement, the evidence suggests that the
situation was one of insistence by the respondent and acquiesce by
the appellant.

Although Judge Daniels did not commit clear error

in making the findings he did,
to

the

facts,

are

his findings as they apply the law

internally

inconsistent

and

show

a

misunderstanding as to how the doctrine of estoppel is applied.
In determining what is prospective or future child support,
and an agreement to reduce it, as opposed to what is an arrearage,
and an agreement to forgive it, one must look at the respective
obligations as of the time the alleged agreement was made.

In the

instant case, the oral agreement respondent alleges took place in
the fall of 1979, was then as to a future child support obligation,
not

an

agreement

subsequent

to

Revised

forgive what
Child

were then

Support

Agreement

arrearages.
document

The
signed

approximately one year later, was again an agreement as to what
would

then

agreement

have
to

been

forgive

future
what

child

would

support

have

then

payments,
been

not

an

arrearages.

Although the estoppel defense may be available to the child support
obligor who had an agreement to forgive what were, at the time the
agreement was made, arrearages, it cannot apply to a future child
support obligation.

Any attempt to modify the terms of a decree of

divorce as to a future child support obligation must be in writing,
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submitted to the court, and approved in advance.
Respondent does not claim that he has ever entered into an
agreement
arrearages.

with

appellant

to

forgive

unpaid

child

support

When looking back at the child support amounts at

issue in this matter, one must realize that all amounts which
appellant seeks to obtain were yet to be paid, and were future
amounts at the time the alleged agreements were made.
Appellant testified that she never agreed to a reduction in
child support, but acquiesced when she realized that her former
husband was not going to do more for her than he had said he would.
Her acquiesence in the face of that, including the taking of the
lesser amount sent her in child support and the writing of letters
concerning it, are not the affirmative acts which constitute the
basis of an estoppel, even if the estoppel argument were available
to the respondent.
It was not reasonable for the respondent to rely on the
acquiesence of the appellant.

The demands he made on her in

connect with "letting her" sell the house and leave the state, were
not reasonable demands.

One cannot rely on the unconscionable.

If

respondent had gone to court in Colorado, as he claims he wanted
to, but cannot explain as to why he did not, the unreasonableness
of his expectations and reliance thereon would have become clear to
him.

No court in this state, or in Colorado, would have allowed

the respondent to withhold child support as a penalty for selling
the house and leaving the state.

Likewise, no court would have

forced the appellant take her share of the equity in the home as
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pre paid child support.

There was no evidence that this was ever

agreed on or considered by the court or the parties.
The

respondent

never

changed

position

financially

or

economically because of the appellant's leaving in any way that
hurt him.

There was no evidence that he did.

His children moving

away, the selling of the home and the payment to him of his equity,
and the loss of a tax deduction when he had no income, were not
changes to his economic detriment.

There is no hardship worked

upon the respondent by allowing the appellant to now recover the
child support which he should have paid.

In fact, unless interest

is awarded on the child support arrearage owed, the respondent is
better off for not having paid it.
It was the burden of persuasion of the respondent at the
subsequent hearing on his petition

for modification to put on

evidence with regard to all issues he believed relevant to his
request for a reduction in child support.

If the only evidence

before the court at the time of that hearing were as to the
respondent's income and earning ability, and not as to the other
five elements suggested by Section 78-45-7(2), it was because the
petitioner, with the burden to present evidence, failed to do so.
In fact, evidence was presented to the court to the effect that the
appellant was unemployed, that her husband was unemployed, and that
the respondent's unemployed status was the result of self imposed
poverty, and that the respondent had earning capacity sufficient to
allow him to pay the reduced amount.
The Revised Child Support Agreement was not evidence from
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which the court could deduce the needs of the parties children in a
trial in 1985.

There was no evidence that said agreement had

anything to do with the needs of the children, even in 1980.

WHEREFORE,

appellant

prays

that

the

judgment

of

the

Honorable Scott Daniels, subsequent to the March 5th-6th, 1985
hearing denying appellant judgment for child support arrearages, be
reversed, and that appellant be awarded judgment for $19,840.00 for
arrearages arising in child support between August, 1979 and March
1st, 1985, plus interest on said amount from March 1st, 1985 to the
date of this courts decision, at the judgment rate of 12% per
annum.
Appellant further prays that this matter be remanded to the
District

Court

for hearing on requests for costs of court and

attorneys fees incurred in bringing and maintaining this appeal.
Appellant further prays that respondents cross-appeal be
denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^clay of February, 1988.

^L^v^w

David A. McPhie
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered two true and correct
copies of Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Brief on Appeal and
Appellant's

Brief

in Response

to Respondent's Cross-Appeal, to

attorney for respondent, David J. Berceau, at 39 Post Office Place,
Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah on February «J^*S 1988.

David A. McPhie
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STATS J0F C0U>8AD0
Civil Action NO. D-20328
Division 1
In re the Marriage of:
CAROL JEANNE BLACKBURN,
Petitioner,
and

SEPARATION AGREEMENT

ROBERT FARRIS, BLACKBURN, JR.,
Respondent*

THIS AGREEMENT, STIPULATION AND CONTRACT entered

into this 18th day of December, 1978, by and between Carol
Jeanne Blackburn, the Petitioner, hereinafter referred to as
•Wife" and Robert Farris Blackburn, Jr., the Respondent, hereinafter referred to as "Husband"; and
WHEREAS, Petitioner and Respondent herein have instituted
their action in the District Court in and for the County of
Arapahoe, State of Colorado, being Civil Action No. D-20328; and
WHEREAS, the Petitioner and Respondent have separated,
and ara not living together as Husband and Wife; and
WHEREAS, it is the mutual desire of the parties that
a full and final adjustment of their property rights, interests,
and claims be settled and determined by the parties to this
Agreement, and that the provision be made for the custody and
support of the unemancipated adnor children of the partiesi and
WHEREAS, «^iOt^th4 partiei h»

stands/th*
l
'

*

~ - /%-*

%?

-**^

believes i * r t < m 4tp 4fc ; i * i r
and freely and fully accepts the provisions, terms, and conditions
thereof.

HOH,THEREFORE, in consideration of the parties and
the liatual covenants and agreements herein contained, receipt
and sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged by each of the
parties hereto, the parties mutually agree, stipulate and covenant
as followst
1.

RELEASE

That except as specified in this Agreement, each party
hereto is hereby released and absolved from any and all obligations
and liabilities for the future acts and duties of the other, and
that each of said parties hereby releases the other from any
and all liabilities, debts, or obligations of any kind or character
incurred by the other, from and after this date, and from any
and all claims, demands, including all claims of either party
upon the other for maintenance of Wife or Husband or otherwise,
it being understood that this instrument is intended to settle
the rights of the parties hereto in all respects, except as
hereinafter provided.
2. AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY
That any and all property acquired from and after the
date hereof shall be the sole and separate property of the party
acquiring the same, and each of said parties hereby respectfully
grants to the other all such further acquisitions of property
as the sole and separate property of the one so acquiring the same.
3. ESTATES
That each of said parties shall have immediate right to
dispose of by Will, his or her respective interest in any and
all property belonging to him or her, or hereafter acquired by
either of the respective parties, and each of the parties hereto
hereby waives any an* all rights to the estate of the other,
including the right to widow's allowance, or any other rights

*•

SEPARATION

The parties may and shall continue to live apart for
the rest of their lives.

Each shall be free from interference,

direct or indirect, by the other as fully as though unmarried.
Each may for his or her separate benefit, engage in any employment,
business or profession he or she may choose.
5.

PROPERTY

The parties make the following disposition and settlement
with respect to their property.
A.

Real Property

The parties are the joint owners of a residence
located at 6518 South Dahlia Circle, Littleton, Colorado.
That real property will remain as the joint property of the
parties until such time in the future as they choose to sell or
otherwise dispose of the property.
The Husband will make the house payment as indicated
below until such time as the house is sold.
If the property is jointly owned at the time of
the death of one of the parties, the deceased's interest shall
pass to the children of the parties.

The parties acknowledge

that this Separation Agreement is not a Will.
B.

Personal Property
1)

The Wife will take as her sole property:
a)

All of the personal belongings now in

b)

The 1973 Volkswagen automobile;

c]

All bank accounts in her name;

her possession;

JtssMtanti

in joint ownership with Husband;
f)

The following items of furniture and

#ou* brown chairs — wood, rocker, and
upholstered
Ottoman
Cabinet humidifier
End table
China cabinet
Two twin beds
Two desks
Small wood bookcase
Small magazine rack
Three dressers
High chair
35mm camera
Garden cart
Electric lawn mower & cord
Bar-b-q Grill
Pioneer stereo receiver
Garard turntable
Two KLH speakers
Washer
Dryer
Refrigerator
White couch
Silverwear
Corningware dishes
Kitchen table 6 two chairs
Four bent wood dining room chairs
Typing table
All lamps except those named as Husband's
property
Pendulum wall clock
Electric typewriter
Badminton set
Croquet set
Volleyball fc net
Picnic table & benches
Picnic basket
Christmas tree & decorations
Girl's Schwinn bicycle
Assorted Garden and Lawn tools
Shop brooms
Folding lawn chair
Trash cans 6 cart
Six-foot aluminum ladder
All children's items
Double bed
Dresser with mirror
Wall mirror
Two yellow night stands
Parsons dining room table
Hide-a-bed couch
End table (round)
Director's chair
Tall metal bookshelves
•lack wood bookshelves
Green bean bag chair"
Blue Antique chair
White antique trunk
Two pink suitcases
Black/white TV
Sewing machine t cabinet
r^Mnpt *tf»r«»ofiradio

Wicker phone stand
Kirby vacuum cleaner
Guitar
Antique Victrola
Cedar chest
Lennox china
Crystal water goblets
Instamatic camera
Numerous books
Numerous record albums
Crock pot
Pot and pan set
Wood tennis racket & press
Clothes hamper
Two clock radios
2)

The Husband will take as his sole property:
a)

All of the personal belongings now in

b)

The 1967 Mercury automobile and the 1976

c)

All bank accounts in his name;

d)

All interest in insurance policies in

his possession;

Ford Pickup;

his name except that the Husband will maintain life insurance
in an amount of at least $10,000.00 on himself and shall name
either the Wife or the children as beneficiaries.

If at such time

as that policy is cancelled by mutual agreement between the
parties the Husband shall retain all cash value of the policy*
e)

U.S. Savings Bonds now in }oint ownership

with the Wife, of a value of approximately $360.00;
f)

The following items of furniture and

household goods:
White upholstered chair
Beige chair & couch
U.S. map
Electric sander
Floor lamp
End table
Green swag lamp
Metal file cabinet
I#arge metal bookcases
Brown cane table lamp
Flourescent light 4 extension cord
Two tennis racquets
Crank ice cream maker

Metal m m k
Two grey/**uitcases
Blue suitcase
Steam iron
Toaster
Ironing board (yellow & white)
GE canister vacuum
Manual Royal typewriter
Small B-BQ grill
Two tool boxes
Numerous tools
VTM electronic instrument
Encyclopedia Britanica
Numerous record albums
Binoculars
Instamatic camera
Trouble light
Extension cord (50')
Lawn chair
Miscellaneous pots & pans
Golf clubs
Oscillating fan
Pop corn popper
Short handled flat shovel
6.

DEBTS
There are no outstanding joint debts of the parties

other than the home mortgage which shall be paid by the Husband
as set forth below.
7.

CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN
It is agreed that the Wife is a fit and proper person

to have custody of the children and that she shall have custody
of the minor children of the parties, subject to reasonable and
liberal visitation rights of the Husband.
This provision is agreed to be in the best interests
of the children at the present time.
8. CHILD SUPPORT

is presently approximately f320.00feac^.^nthV^^%a«i[iftgsaid
payment directly to;Mellon Mortgage Co.# on or before the first
of each month. This payment will include, and the Husband shaL
be responsible for, payments on the principal, interest, all ta:

of these payments should increase, the Husband shall pay the
increased amounts.
b)

The Husband will pay directly to the Wife the

sum of $120.00 on or before the 20th of each month.
c)

The Husband will pay all medical, dental, and

necessary orthondotia bills for the children and shall maintain
health insurance for their benefit.

The Wife will pay all

costs for necessary medicines.
9.

MAINTENANCE
Neither party shall pay maintenance to the other.

10.

ATTORNEY FEES
The Husband shall pay to the Wife one-half the

attorney fees and costs incurred by the Wife in this
11.

tion.

RELEASE FROM LIABILITY
The parties hereby mutually release and agree to

hold harmless each other from all actions, claims and obligations
which either of them had or may have against each other by reason
of any cause up to the date of this agreement.
12.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
No modification or waiver of any of the terms of

this agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by
both parties.
This agreement shall be governed by the laws of
the State of Colorado.
This agreement constitutes the entire understanding
of the parties.

There are no agreements other than those set

forth herein.
Each pa :ty acknowledges that he or she has read
this agreement, has been fully informed about this agreement,
understands this agreement, and is signing this agreement freely and
voluntarily.

CAROL JEANNE BLACKBURN, Petitioner
STATE OF COLORADO

)

COUNTY OF

)

)

SB.

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this
of

m

day

, 1978, by CAROL JEANNE BLACKBURN, Petitioner.

Notary Public
My commission expires:

ROBERT FARRIS BLACKBURN, JR., Respondent
STATE OF COLORADO

)

COUNTY OF

)

)

88.

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this
Of

day

, 1978, by ROBERT FARRIS BLACKBURN, JR.,

Respondent.

Notary Public
My commission expires:

THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
7

^COUNTY OF

?» ,

ARAPAHOE

STATE OF COLORADO

_ CU.tr *„. t
"c/:l:,-;;l••••••.'/.VG•

In re the Marriage of:
CABQI^JEANNE BLACKBURN.
Petitioner

CIVIL ACTION NO.£r2-Q 3 -2 8 —
DECREE

and

(Dissolution of Marriage)
ROBERT FARRTS BLACKRURN, JR.
Respondent

Tliis matter was heard on its merits on December 18
was represented by RENNET)? .K. STUART
respondent * (xppoxpoixb}::xxx.

—
txxxxxx

_, 197?

Petitioner

_ , attorney of record;
&G££c7i)iv:'.-lyi.iv.:i\)

(

:/£ (xppcxfcrirtjyxxxxxa
not appear in i>er*kn^**by-ftj U.rMfry')
out counsel). The Court has examined the record, heard the evidence and the r{;i!»MJJ!- <.f ruin
and based thereon, makes the following findings:
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this action.
2. One of the parties,.£<'rol J e a n n e B l a c k b u r n
. has be*'-fiat: ;:
state, for ninety days preceding the commencement of this proceeding.
S. The marriage between the parties is irretrievably broken.
4. The separation agreement between the parties, # (a copy of which is attache 1 1
hibit A and incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim) has been considered by the Oowri
unconscionable as to support, maintenance, and property.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a deer j if.-,
entered, and the marriage between the parties hereto is hereby dissolved.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall perform the respective pro\ ;.„;• i
ration agreement, attach H liercto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein as if set fv>;-;h \
apply to each of them.t

* lllC:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the custody of the minor child r c n , Dh<' Y . if:.:
BLACKBURN and GINA LORRAINE BLACKBURN

be granted to the XeL *! i ( ,J -

-

AND IT IS FURTHER OIJ) KM), ADJUDGED, AND DECREED by the G
t h e Respondent s h a l l
support for the ninor

pay a t l e a s t

$ 440.00

por nc

children.

_ IT 13 FURTHER CRDrRED THAT THIS COURT RETAINS SUCH JURISDICTION ul« 'ill!:
AG\ ION AS IS PROVIDED BY I,AW.
lUed this
Coloi -do.

II

day nf _ n-ccobfir.

Approve 1^3 to F o r — / ?
Attorney for P e t i t i o n e r

, 19 78 , at

Littlgjon _

^^^
[A/I

v>

fT^~rs

"lAz

**""

DISTRICT JUDC.E /
Attorney for

' ' '"

REVISED CHILD SUPPORT AGREEMENT
IT IS HEREBY AGREED between these two parties,
Carol Seiler Blackburn and Robert Farris Blackburn, Jr., in
regards to their divorce decree and separation agreement
dated December 18, 1978, that the following changes be made:
1. Robert will continue to pay Carol $120 per
month for child support with an added inflation adjustment
as follows: in January of each year, the monthly payment will
increase by $10, ie, beginning January 1981, monthly payments
will be $130; beginning January 1982, monthly payments will be
$140, etc.
2. Robert will pay all travel expenses of the
children and himself associated with his reasonable and liberal
visitation rights.
3. Carol will take income tax deductions for the
children so long as Robert is paying less than the IRS guidelines for monthly child support for qualifying exemptions.
4. Carol will purchase medical insurance for the
children on a group plan and Robert will reimburse Carol for
the cost difference (if any) between single and family rates.
5. Robert will continue to reimburse Carol for
all the children's medical and dental bills (except orthodontia)
Carol will continue to pay for all medicines for the children.

November 13, 1980
M f E

